

INTRADEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE

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TO: The Honorable Board of Police Commissioners

FROM: Chief of Police

SUBJECT: OFFICER INVOLVED SHOOTING, FID NO. 050-19

Honorable Members:

The following is my review, analysis, and findings for Officer Involved Shooting (OIS), Force Investigation Division (FID) No. 050-19. A Use of Force Review Board (UOFRB) was convened on this matter on July 27, 2020. I have adopted the recommendations from the UOFRB for this incident. I hereby submit my findings in accordance with Police Commission policy.

SUMMARY¹

On October 22, 2019, Officers M. Meraz, Serial No. 42991, M. Bravo, Serial No. 36154, and J. Carbajal, Serial No. 39480, Hollenbeck Patrol Division, Special Problems Unit (SPU), were in full uniform, driving an unmarked hybrid police vehicle.² Officers Meraz, Bravo, and Carbajal were assigned as a single, three-person unit. Officer Meraz was the driver, while Officer Bravo was the front passenger and Officer Carbajal was the rear passenger.³

The FID investigation revealed the following personnel were also on duty the day of the incident: Officers A. Mott, Serial No. 42551, M. Malone, Serial No 42698, Hollenbeck SPU, and Sergeant J. Covarrubias, Serial No. 35443, Hollenbeck SPU Supervisor. All of the aforementioned personnel were in full uniform, driving marked black and white police vehicles.

According to Officer Meraz, the SPU *mission was to provide crime suppression, as well as look for wanted suspects for detectives and to also assist them*. Officer Meraz explained that Officer Bravo's partner was on a regularly scheduled day off. On the day of the incident, Officer Bravo *joined* Officers Meraz and Carbajal during their crime suppression efforts, with the approval of

¹ The summary and the investigation completed by FID for this incident have been provided to the Board of Police Commissioners.

² The FID investigation revealed the vehicle was a Chevrolet Impala and was equipped with a forward-facing red light, siren, blue and amber rear window lights, and a police radio. The vehicle did not have a Digital In-Car Video System (DICVS) or ballistic door panels. The officers received permission to use the plain vehicle from the Commanding Officer of Hollenbeck Area.

³ The FID investigation revealed Officer Bravo's partner was on a regularly scheduled day off. Therefore, Officer Bravo was assigned to the same unit as Officers Meraz and Carbajal. The three officers were conducting crime suppression in the Chevrolet Impala plain vehicle.

Sergeant Covarrubias. Officer Meraz stated their *plan* was to have Officer Carbajal *primarily* as *communications*, while Officers Meraz and Bravo would be *contact or cover*, *depending on* where the suspect was in relation to their police vehicle.

According to Detective II J. Yoshida, Serial No. 30133, Hollenbeck Homicide, he was at Hollenbeck Community Police Station (CPS) and on duty, when he was notified of a call at the Hollenbeck Detective's Front Desk. The *caller* asked Detective Yoshida to call him Lawrence and did not want to provide his real identity. Lawrence stated he had information with regard to a murder suspect. Lawrence advised Detective Yoshida that he knew who committed *the killing on 1st Street near Mission Street*. Lawrence stated the suspect's name was "Rudy" and that he saw Rudy, *from time to time*, near Gless Street and 1st Street, *by the park*.⁴ Lawrence said Rudy had a nickname of *Yak, short for maniac*, and was about *five-eight, one hundred forty pounds*, with a *thin build*. Lawrence stated he did not know Rudy, but he frequently saw him hanging out, *doing what gangsters do*. Lawrence further stated he believed Rudy was involved in the homicide because he had *overheard* Rudy saying he, "got the guy and got him in the face." Detective Yoshida recalled a recent homicide wherein a victim had been *shot in the face*.

Note: The FID investigation revealed that the homicide was committed in Hollenbeck Area on October 21, 2019, at approximately 0100 hours near the 100 block of Myers Street. The victim was a member of The Mob Crew (TMC) criminal street gang and was killed in TMC territory, within a homeless encampment known as the "White House". Detective Yoshida was the Investigating Officer (IO) of the homicide.

According to Detective Yoshida, with the assistance of Officer S. Megliorino, Serial No. 40050, Hollenbeck Detective Division, they were able to identify a male, matching the description provide by Lawrence, with the *moniker of Maniac*. Detective Yoshida and Officer Megliorino, concluded Lawrence's description matched that of a documented TMC gang member named Rodolfo Louis Coleman.⁵

According to Detective Yoshida, his shift ended and he departed to his residence. While at his residence, Detective Yoshida received another call from Lawrence. Detective Yoshida asked Lawrence to verify the last four digits of his phone number, which Detective Yoshida read off to Lawrence. Lawrence verified the number did belong to him.⁶ During the call, Lawrence asked Detective Yoshida *to do something* because Coleman was out *banging on people*, which Lawrence explained Coleman was stopping pedestrian and vehicle traffic coming onto Gless Street and asking where people were from in order to protect what Coleman's claimed as gang

⁴ Pecan Recreational Center, located at 1st Street and Gless Street, was an open park and recreational center on the east side of Gless Street between 1st Street and 3rd Street. This area was interchangeably referenced as Pecan Park.

⁵ Rodolfo Louis Coleman, male, Hispanic, 29 years of age. Rodolfo Coleman was five feet, nine inches tall, weighed approximately 150 pounds and had a date of birth of December 14, 1989. Coleman had a criminal history that included convictions for Possession and Transportation of Narcotics, Possession of a Firearm by a Felon and a Probation Violation for being a Felon in Possession of Ammunition. Coleman was a documented member of the criminal street gang TMC with a moniker of "Maniak".

⁶ The FID investigation revealed that Detective Yoshida determined Lawrence was no longer just an *anonymous citizen* since Detective Yoshida had Lawrence's contact information, making Lawrence a "trusted source" of information. Detective Yoshida stated he could contact Lawrence again if necessary.

territory. Lawrence said Rudy *had a gun and was wearing a fanny pack while standing at the fence line at 1st Street and Gless Street*. Detective Yoshida asked for a *head to toe* description of Coleman. Lawrence stated Coleman was wearing, "a baseball cap, gray hoody sweat top, gray Nike shorts, gray Nike shoes, and white knee-high socks with a black fanny pack with a firearm inside." Detective Yoshida requested Lawrence to stay on the line while Detective Yoshida reported the incident.

According to Detective Yoshida, he called the Hollenbeck Patrol Division Watch Commander line where an officer answered the phone. Detective Yoshida asked if there had been any radio calls generated for a *415 man with a gun*.⁷ Detective Yoshida was advised that there were no radio calls of that nature. Detective Yoshida called Sergeant Covarrubias asking for assistance and said he had Lawrence on the *other line, on hold*. Detective Yoshida briefed Sergeant Covarrubias about Lawrence's information on Coleman. Detective Yoshida advised Sergeant Covarrubias that he was in the process of investigating Coleman's involvement in the homicide. Detective Yoshida told Sergeant Covarrubias that since an investigation had not been completed on Coleman's relation to the homicide, Sergeant Covarrubias would not be detaining Coleman for anything related to the homicide. Instead, Detective Yoshida advised Sergeant Covarrubias to consider the information provided by Lawrence regarding Coleman's current action of "banging on people" while being a documented gang member and possibly in possession of a firearm. Detective Yoshida advised Sergeant Covarrubias that Coleman could be booked on the open charge of being a prohibited possessor if he were to be found with a firearm. Detective Yoshida advised Sergeant Covarrubias to treat the information as a *radio call for a 415 man with a gun*. Detective Yoshida discussed what *resources* were available and if they would be wearing a full uniform. Sergeant Covarrubias told Detective Yoshida that he had a *full crew* and they were in *uniform*. Detective Yoshida advised Sergeant Covarrubias to make a *game plan*. Detective Yoshida advised Sergeant Covarrubias to send a SPU officer to meet with Officer Megliorino, who was still on duty at Hollenbeck CPS, to obtain additional information on Coleman.

The FID investigation revealed Detective Yoshida notified his immediate supervisor, Lieutenant C. Mayberry, Serial No. 32472, Hollenbeck Division Detectives. Detective Yoshida also advised Lieutenant R. Rabbett, Serial No. 33690, Operations - Central Bureau (OCB) Homicide, of the information he received with regard to Coleman and the plan to apprehend Coleman.

According to Sergeant Covarrubias, he believed the information received from Detective Yoshida qualified as *exigent circumstances and* would need to be addressed immediately *in the interest of public safety*, similar to a *high priority radio call for a 415 man with a gun*. Sergeant Covarrubias also stated he was concerned for public safety due not only to Coleman's present actions, but also Coleman's likely relation to the homicide. Sergeant Covarrubias directed SPU officers to return to Hollenbeck CPS and briefed them on the information received from Detective Yoshida. *Given the fact that the nature of the investigation was a 415 man with a gun*, Sergeant Covarrubias *recruited two additional patrol units*.

⁷ The term 415 was a commonly used code term derived from the California Penal Code, Section 415 which is a Disturbing the Peace violation.

The FID investigation revealed the two patrol units consisted of the following personnel: Officers G. Blanco, Serial No. 36365, H. Almeda, Serial No. 39529, R. Wilson, Serial No. 39076, and V. Castillo, Serial No. 43929, all assigned to Hollenbeck Patrol Division. According to Sergeant Covarrubias, during the brief he discussed *foot-pursuit concepts, apprehension versus containment, perimeters*, and common routes of egress for TMC gang members in the area of 1st Street and Gless Street. Sergeant Covarrubias directed Officers Meraz, Bravo, and Carbajal to be in an unmarked hybrid police vehicle driving around and monitoring the area of 1st and Gless Street. If Coleman was located by the officers, they would broadcast their observations to gain the assistance of other uniformed officers to detain *Coleman*. If Coleman were to flee, Sergeant Covarrubias directed Officers Meraz, Bravo, and Carbajal to have a communications officer on *simplex* while another broadcast on Hollenbeck *Base Frequency* (**Additional Tactical Debrief Topics – Tactical Planning**).

According to Officer Carbajal, prior to responding to the area of 1st Street and Gless Street, he met with Officer Megliorino and obtained a photograph of Coleman. Officer Carbajal disseminated the photograph to the officers assigned to the operation. Officer Carbajal met with Detective Adrian Parga, Serial No. 27946, Hollenbeck Division, Narcotics Enforcement Detail (NED) at Hollenbeck CPS. Officer Carbajal stated NED had *plain cars which made it easier to go to 1st and Gless Street and scope the location*. If NED were to locate Coleman, NED detectives would broadcast the information and Officers Carbajal, Meraz, and Bravo would *set up containment to take Coleman into custody*. Detective Parga and NED personnel immediately responded to 1st and Gless Street from Hollenbeck CPS and did not attend the brief. Officer Carbajal contacted Communications Division (CD) and requested a *Code Five in the area of 1st Street and Gless Street*. Additionally, Officer Carbajal placed all units involved in the operation Code Six in the area of 1st Street and Gless Street. Officer Carbajal called Sergeant E. De Alba, Serial No. 31350, Hollenbeck Patrol Division, Assistant Watch Commander, to advise him of the operation. After the notifications, had been completed, all units assigned to the operation left Hollenbeck CPS and drove to the area of 1st and Gless Street. Additionally, Officer Carbajal requested an air ship to maintain a high altitude to monitor the area in the event Coleman attempted to flee the area.

According to Detective Yoshida, he received an additional call from Lawrence. Lawrence had just watched Coleman flee from the area of 1st and Gless Street after seeing a police vehicle. Detective Yoshida directed Lawrence to call 9-1-1 if he saw Coleman again. Detective Yoshida called Sergeant Covarrubias and notified him of his conversation with Lawrence and that Coleman had fled. Detective Yoshida believed it was best to *disengage* since their goal was to *mitigate a public risk or public threat*.

Note: The FID investigation revealed approximately forty minutes passed between Lawrence's second and third conversation with Detective Yoshida.

According to Officer Carbajal, as he and Officers Meraz and Bravo traveled southbound on Gless Street, from 1st Street, he heard somebody yell *police*. Officer Carbajal told his partners of what he heard. Detective Yoshida then called and notified Officer Carbajal that Coleman had fled from the location.

According to Sergeant Covarrubias, after receiving the information of Coleman fleeing, he notified the units at scene and ordered them to return to Hollenbeck CPS for a *debrief*. Once all units were gathered at the station, Sergeant Covarrubias conducted his debrief where they discussed whether they *could have done better or could have done anything different*. Sergeant Covarrubias completed the debrief. The two patrol units returned to their normal duties while NED detectives ended their shift. Sergeant Covarrubias and SPU officers discussed other missions they had planned for the shift. Sergeant Covarrubias told the SPU officers he would be at Hollenbeck CPS completing administrative duties. The SPU officers advised Sergeant Covarrubias they were *going back to monitor Pecan Park and just kind of drive around the area to provide extra patrol*. Officer Meraz knew Officer Involved Shootings (OIS) had occurred in that area on prior occasions.

According to Officer Meraz, after the debrief was completed, he and Officers Bravo and Carbajal decided to *go back to resuming normal duties such as crime suppression and extra patrol in high crime areas*. Additionally, part of the SPU duties were to monitor areas that were known to contain *rival gang members* who would often be *shooting at other gang members*. Officers Meraz, Bravo, and Carbajal decided to *return to the area of Pecan Park*, since there was a chance Coleman *would be back out*. Officer Meraz stated that he and his SPU partners were not only familiar with the area of Pecan Park, but were familiar with TMC gang members. Officer Meraz and SPU officers had received *numerous reports of TMC gang members selling narcotics, carrying weapons which included rifles and pistol*.

According to Officer Carbajal, he contacted Officers Mott and Malone and advised that he and Officers Meraz and Bravo were going back to the area of 1st and Gless Street, in an unmarked hybrid police vehicle, and still in full uniform. Officer Carbajal asked Officers Mott and Malone *to stay nearby, at least a block in distance*, just in case they *needed to use them* or if they *needed a backup*.

According to Officer Meraz, he drove southbound on Gless Street. As he drove near the area of 1st Street and Gless Street, Officer Meraz observed Coleman standing on the sidewalk. Officer Meraz observed Coleman wearing a *backwards red hat with either a white or gray shirt with a fanny pack strapped around his shoulder across his chest*. Rodolfo Coleman *looked in Officer Meraz' direction*. Officer Meraz *immediately recognized Coleman* and notified Officers Bravo and Carbajal (**Additional/Equipment – Body Worn Video**).

According to Officer Bravo, they drove *eastbound on 1st Street, approaching Gless Street*. After Officer Meraz negotiated a *southbound* turn onto Gless Street, Officer Bravo observed Coleman standing on the *west sidewalk, next to parked vehicles, on Gless Street*. Rodolfo Coleman was standing *closer to the street than the residential fence line* (**Additional/Equipment – Body Worn Video**).

According to Officer Carbajal, they returned to 1st Street and Gless Street. As the officers were traveling southbound on Gless Street, from 1st Street, *they drove past the alley* and observed *a couple people playing in the park*. As they continued *southbound on Gless Street*, they reached *mid-block, about two or three houses south of the east/west alley*. Officer Carbajal observed a

male individual wearing a red hat, gray shirt, matching the description of Coleman. Simultaneously, Officer Carbajal overheard Officers Meraz and Bravo state the male was Coleman (**Additional/Equipment – Body Worn Video**).

According to Officer Meraz, he observed Coleman *standing on the sidewalk, looking in Officer Meraz' direction*, with his hand *in his fanny pack*. Officer Meraz observed Coleman *look at him*. Officer Meraz placed his vehicle *in park* and opened his driver door with his *left hand*. As Officer Meraz began exiting the driver seat to *conduct a stop on Coleman*, he observed a *muzzle flash* and a *loud bang* coming from Coleman's *direction*. Officer Meraz *immediately recognized* Coleman was *shooting at him*. Officer Meraz *leaned out* of his vehicle as he *drew his service pistol*. Officer Meraz utilized a *two-handed grip* to take hold of his service pistol (**Drawing/Exhibiting**).

According to Officer Bravo, he opened his front passenger door and *stepped out* of the vehicle after he observed Coleman. While stepping out, Officer Bravo observed the *muzzle flash* and *heard gunshots*. Officer Bravo made *eye contact* with Coleman and observed his arms *extending*. Officer Bravo believed he was "behind the curve" and knew he was *being shot at* by Coleman. Officer Bravo *drew his service pistol in order to defend his life* and the lives of his *partners* (**Drawing/Exhibiting**).

According to Officer Carbajal, he began to exit the rear passenger seat of his vehicle after seeing Coleman. Officer Carbajal heard *shots being fired* in his and his partner officers' *direction*. Officer Carbajal immediately began to *jump out* of his vehicle. Officer Carbajal heard the sound of a *window shattering* from his vehicle. Officer Carbajal redeployed *slowly* to the *right of a car* parked next to the *west sidewalk* of Gless Street. Officer Carbajal *had sight of Coleman shooting* in his *direction*. Officer Carbajal *drew his service pistol utilizing a two-handed grip* (**Drawing/Exhibiting**).

According to Officer Meraz, he observed *sparks*, from Coleman's *direction*, in front of their vehicle and *pieces of cloth breaking*, consistent with a firearm being *fired from a fanny pack or through a bag*. Officer Meraz believed it was possibly a *higher caliber weapon*. Officer Meraz exited the vehicle and *crouched low for cover* while positioned *between the frame of the window of the driver door and the A-pillar of the vehicle*.⁸ Officer Meraz utilized a *two-handed grip* on his service pistol and fired in a *southwest direction* at Coleman. Each time Officer Meraz *would shoot*, he would *quickly reassess to see if Coleman was still standing and firing his firearm*. Officer Meraz observed that *every time* he did a reassessment, *it appeared that Coleman was still firing rounds at Officer Meraz and holding a firearm*. Officer Meraz determined Coleman was a *very real threat* to Officer Meraz and his partner officers. Officer Meraz recalled he fired *nine rounds* from his service pistol in a consecutive manner, with a *pause* in between each round he fired. Officer Meraz believed Coleman fired approximately *three to four rounds* in his *direction* (**Lethal Force**).

⁸ A-Pillar, the front window vertical support near the driver and passenger doors.

According to Officer Bravo, he did not observe Coleman with a *weapon*. However, *as soon as he stepped out of his police vehicle*, Officer Bravo observed Coleman's *hands extended* and observed a *muzzle flash*. Officer Bravo observed each muzzle flash had the same *circular pattern*. Officer Bravo, in response to seeing Coleman's muzzle flash and observing Coleman shooting at him and his partners, acquired his *front sight*, and fired his *first round* at Coleman and second round as a *controlled pair*.⁹ As Officer Bravo fired at Coleman, the window of the front passenger door in which Officer Bravo was behind *shattered*. Officer Bravo was unsure if the shattering was caused by Officer Bravo firing or if it was due to Coleman firing at Officer Bravo (**Lethal Force – First Volley**).

According to Officer Bravo, after firing the first two rounds from his service pistol and hearing the glass shatter in front of him, Officer Bravo believed Coleman's rounds were striking the vehicle that Officers Bravo, Meraz, and Carbajal had deployed from. Officer Bravo assumed a kneeling position to *get as low* as he could behind his vehicle door and *pied out next to the door* to see Coleman. Officer Bravo observed Coleman backing up in a *shuffling* manner, towards a Suburban vehicle parked alongside the curb. Officer Bravo observed two *muzzle flashes* and heard a shot. From his kneeling position, Officer Bravo fired an additional round at Coleman. Officer Bravo stated Coleman was still standing at the Suburban when he fired the round at Coleman. Officer Bravo then observed Coleman continue to back up. Officer Bravo fired an additional round after the last muzzle flash and gunshot that he had heard. Officer Bravo stated the rounds were in a southwesterly direction towards Coleman (**Lethal Force – Second Volley**).

According to Officer Carbajal, when Coleman began *shooting*, it *sounded like rapid fire*, from *different weapons*, but *could only see the muzzle flash* of Coleman's firearm. Officer Carbajal was unsure if Coleman was utilizing multiple firearms due to the sound of Coleman's firearm being different from Officer Carbajal's service pistol. Officer Carbajal was *in fear for his life* and the *lives of his partners*. Officer Carbajal also considered the *community* and the fact that there were *kids* in the area. Officer Carbajal believed Coleman had *no remorse* or regard for *human life*. Officer Carbajal was in a position of cover behind the parked vehicle near the west sidewalk and north of Coleman. Officer Carbajal was able to focus on Coleman from that position. Officer Carbajal placed his *finger on the trigger* of his service pistol and fired *one round* in Coleman's *direction*, as Coleman simultaneously fired at Officer Carbajal and his partner officers. Officer Carbajal fired in a southerly *direction* as he was *aiming at Coleman*. Officer Carbajal, after firing his first round at Coleman, *pressed* the trigger of his service pistol a *second time* to fire again and felt he had a *spongy trigger*.¹⁰ Officer Carbajal recalled his *training* and *immediately looked at* his service pistol and observed a *round in the chamber* and the slide of his service pistol was *not fully forward*. Officer Carbajal recognized his service pistol had *mis-fed* the second round. Officer Carbajal conducted a *tap*, by *hitting the top of the*

⁹ A controlled pair consists of firing two rounds with the sight picture being verified (flash sight picture) before each shot. At moderate distances, the controlled pair may be appropriate in order to ensure that both rounds hit the target (LAPD Firearms Manual, "Firing in Pairs", Page 29).

¹⁰ A spongy trigger is an inconsistent movement of the pistol's trigger and is often an indication of a malfunction of a firearm.

slide, and re-racked the slide to place his service pistol was back in *service* (**Lethal Force and Additional Tactical Debrief Topics –Loading Standards and Service Pistol Malfunction**).¹¹

According to Officer Meraz, he *communicated* with his partners that he was going to *move to the left and redeploy away from the car where the suspect had last seen him*. Officer Meraz ran at a *45-degree angle* to his *next point of cover*, which was a *black truck* where he *used the engine block as cover*, in a *crouched position*. Officer Meraz assessed and *made sure* Coleman was no longer *shooting* at him. Officer Meraz notified his partner officers that he *was going to reload*. Once Officer Meraz *decided it was a good time to reload*, he *took his magazine out, held it between his fingers, and retrieved another magazine and loaded it* into his service pistol. Officer Meraz *reassessed* again then *tucked the magazine* that was already in his service pistol, *behind his magazine pouches* in case he *needed it later* Officer Meraz conducted the in-battery tactical speed reload as he waited for more units to arrive.

According to Officer Bravo, as he was kneeling behind the door of the vehicle, his *ears were ringing so loud* he could not hear anyone broadcasting. Officer Bravo planned to broadcast and reached for his hand held radio. Officer Bravo assessed and could no longer observe Coleman. Officer Bravo placed his service pistol onto the ground as he *grabbed* his hand-held *radio* and increased the volume. Officer Bravo *saw* Officer Carbajal was already broadcasting. Coleman ran to a *Suburban* vehicle where Officer Bravo lost sight of him. Officer Bravo left his position of cover and redeployed behind a red Honda Civic. Officer Bravo could hear his partners stating that Coleman *was bedded down by the cars*, but Officer Bravo could not observe Coleman. Officer Bravo *thought* Coleman was *between cars on the curb* or *was in the gutter*. After Officer Bravo had redeployed, Officer Bravo could *feel blood running down his leg*. Officer Bravo pulled his right pant leg up and *saw blood* and believed that he *got grazed by a bullet*. However, not in pain, Officer Bravo maintained his position of cover and realized that he had only been cut by the broken glass from his passenger window and not injured by a bullet. Officer Bravo switched out his magazine from his service pistol and reloaded his service pistol with a new *magazine*. Officer Bravo also *de-cocked* his service pistol *from single action to double action* *just to put his service pistol in a safer condition while on the perimeter* (**Debriefing Point No.1 – Retention of Service Pistol During Tactical Incident / Debriefing Point No. 2 – Utilization of Cover and Additional Tactical Debrief Topics – Basic Firearm Safety Rules**).

According to Officer Carbajal, he *sidestepped to the left* and moved to *the rear of their vehicle to take cover*. Officer Carbajal took hold of his handheld police radio and broadcast *officer needs help, shots fired*. Officer Carbajal provided Coleman's *direction of travel*. While broadcasting, Officer Carbajal could *no longer see* Coleman, but *could see shadows* approximately *two hundred feet south*, on the *west side* of the street. Officer Carbajal heard Officer Meraz stating Coleman was *bedded down underneath* a car. Officer Carbajal also heard Officer Bravo state he *had been hit*. Officer Carbajal advised CD of Officer Bravo's injury and provided a description of Coleman. Officer Carbajal *requested a Rescue Ambulance (RA)* for Officer Bravo. Officer Carbajal did not attempt to apprehend Coleman because at that point, they were in *containment*

¹¹ An out of battery pistol occurs when the pistol's slide is retracted and is not in the forward firing position. When the slide is in the out of battery position, the weapon cannot be fired (LAPD Firearms Manual, July 2015, Page 175).

mode. Officer Carbajal decided to wait until their responding *resources* arrived and a *perimeter* was set up (**Additional Tactical Debrief Topics – Situational Awareness**).

According to Officer Mott, he and Officer Malone were driving in the area of North Boyle Avenue and 1st Street when he heard *ten to twelve rapid* shots being fired in the area of 1st Street and Gless Street. Officer Mott heard Officer Carbajal's *help call* and broadcasts indicating Coleman had fired at Officer Carbajal and was running southbound, towards 4th street. According to Officer Mott, he began driving his police vehicle towards 4th Street and Gless Street. While doing so, Officer Mott drew his service pistol, while seated in his police vehicle, due to the tactical situation and based on the actions Coleman already took in firing at Officers Meraz, Bravo, and Carbajal. Officer Mott stated he drew his service pistol and held it with his finger off of the trigger. Officer Mott drew his service pistol because he *had been ambushed on a previous occasion and wanted to be prepared* in case Coleman appeared in the street (**Additional/Equipment – Driving While Maintaining Control of Service Pistol**).¹²

According to Officer Mott, he stopped his police vehicle at the intersection of 4th Street and Gless Street to hold a *position* on the *perimeter*. Officers Mott and Malone assisted in directing traffic away from the perimeter (**Additional/Equipment – Profanity**).

According to Officer Malone, while at 4th Street and Gless Street, he observed a white vehicle *circling the block* approximately *three times*. Officer Malone *put two and two together* and determined Coleman could have possibly been inside of the vehicle. However, the vehicle continued driving and left the area. The FID investigation revealed Officers Mott pointed his service pistol in the direction of the unknown, white vehicle (**Additional/Equipment – Basic Firearm Safety Rules**).

The FID investigation revealed Officers Mott and Malone, while holding the perimeter at 4th Street and Gless Street, were directing traffic away from the perimeter. While doing so, they approached a vehicle with three occupants. Officers Mott and Malone's BWV depicted them checking the vehicle, ensuring Coleman was not inside. After completing the check, Officer Mott walked away from the passenger side of the unknown vehicle while Officer Malone was still standing at the vehicle's driver side, speaking to the driver (**Additional/Equipment – Situational Awareness**).

The FID investigation revealed Sergeant A. Demolina, Serial No. 26450, Pilot, and Officer M. O'Conner, Serial No. 34596, Tactical Flight Officer, Air Support Division (ASD), arrived overhead and began directing responding units while setting up a perimeter around the OIS location and Command Post (CP) at Mariachi Plaza parking lot.¹³ Additionally, In response to the help call Sergeant D. Grant, Serial No. 34715, Hollenbeck Patrol Division, initiated her response.

¹² Officers Mott and Malone were previously involved in an OIS. As Officers Mott and Malone sat in their stopped police vehicle, a male carrying a handgun began firing at Officers Mott and Malone (FID Case No. 41-19).

¹³ Mariachi Plaza was located at East 1st Street and Baily Street.

According to Sergeant Covarrubias, he was at Hollenbeck CPS when he heard the help call and began to respond to the area. While enroute, Sergeant Covarrubias thought Coleman would possibly attempt to flee as Sergeant Covarrubias *realized they had said shots fired and there was possibly an officer involved shooting*. Considering his previous brief with Officers Meraz, Bravo, and Carbajal wherein routes of travel for TMC gang members were discussed, Sergeant Covarrubias, considered himself as *one of the initial units responding*, stopped at 1st Street and Gless Street to assume a perimeter position. Sergeant Covarrubias did so to prevent Coleman from *coming back around* on the officers. Sergeant Covarrubias made the decision to place himself there until the next unit responded. However, immediately after, he heard CD broadcast that Officer Bravo had been injured. *At that moment*, Sergeant Covarrubias observed Sergeant Grant and saw her vehicle was already in motion. Sergeant Covarrubias advised Sergeant Grant to go directly to the OIS location. Sergeant Covarrubias stated he would rather be with the involved officers, but in that moment, the *pressing need was to have a supervisor there to help them*. Sergeant Covarrubias stated if he would have asked Sergeant Grant to replace him, she would be losing *seconds* that could have been spent *rendering aid or getting something done* (Additional/Equipment – Body Worn Video).

According to Sergeant Grant, upon her arrival she *observed the involved officers were down the street, south of 1st Street, on Gless Street*. Sergeant Grant *attempted to calm the situation and take control, making sure the officers had cover and was prepared in case Coleman returned and began firing again*. After being relieved from his perimeter position, Sergeant Covarrubias continued his response to the OIS location and met with Sergeant Grant. Sergeant Grant advised Sergeant Covarrubias that Officers Meraz, Bravo, and Carbajal were the *shooting officers* and advised Sergeant Covarrubias to remove those officers and take them back to the CP. Sergeant Grant attempted to acquire a *shield* from responding officers and tried to *get citizens back inside of their residences* (Additional/Equipment – Body Worn Video).

The FID investigation revealed the following personnel arrived at scene: Sergeant E. De Alba, Serial No. 31350, Hollenbeck Patrol Division, Assistant Watch Commander, Detective II R. Chavarria, Serial No. 30816, Hollenbeck Division Detectives,¹⁴ and Sergeant J. Muniz, Serial No. 30963, Transit Services Division (TSD).

According to Sergeant Covarrubias, he arrived and *assumed* the role of *incident commander* (IC). Sergeant Covarrubias believed there was more of a *tactical concern* and therefore, did not immediately remove Officers Meraz, Bravo, and Carbajal from the location at that time. Sergeant Covarrubias communicated with ASD to contain the area and secured the Body Worn Video (BWV) devices from Officers Meraz, Bravo, and Carbajal by placing the BWV devices into Sergeant Covarrubias' police vehicle. Sergeant Covarrubias directed Detective Chavarria and Sergeant Muniz and to separate and monitor the involved officers.

Sergeant Covarrubias monitored and obtained a PSS from Officer Meraz. Sergeant Covarrubias transported Officer Meraz to the CP where they remained in the event a field show up was

¹⁴ Detective Chavarria was a detective supervisor at the time of this incident.

needed. When Officer Meraz was no longer needed at the CP, Sergeant Covarrubias transported Officer Meraz to Hollenbeck CPS.

Sergeant Muniz monitored and obtained a PSS from Officer Carbajal. Sergeant Muniz then transported Officer Carbajal to Hollenbeck CPS for monitoring.

According to Detective Chavarria, he drove Officer Bravo to the CP where Officer Bravo was separated and monitored. Detective Chavarria obtained a PSS from Officer Bravo. Detective Chavarria transported Officer Bravo to Hollenbeck CPS and continued monitoring Officer Bravo **(Additional/Equipment – Body Worn Video)**.

The FID investigation revealed that the Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team and the K-9 Unit, Metropolitan Division, responded to the CP.

According to Sergeant De Alba, upon his arrival to the location, Sergeant Covarrubias provided a brief assessment of the circumstances. Sergeant De Alba directed officers on the perimeter to don their ballistic helmets and Sergeant Covarrubias to remove the Officers Meraz, Bravo, and Carbajal for separation and monitoring *since there was no need for them to be there, tactically* as Sergeant De Alba had assumed the role of IC. Sergeant De Alba broadcast to CD that he was *assuming IC* and stated he was *Code Six*. Sergeant De Alba verified with ASD that the perimeter was secure. Once he received a response from ASD stating the perimeter was secure, Sergeant De Alba left the location and responded to the CP. Sergeant De Alba secured an *administrative frequency* and directed officers *to use it for nontactical communications because a K-9 team may be conducting a limited search of the area*. Sergeant De Alba met with the K-9 supervisor who was at scene and discussed the *possibility of a limited search of the street side of where the shooting had occurred and a limited search of the driveway just to ensure the suspect was not in the area*. Sergeant De Alba was concerned with Coleman's *safety* and believed Coleman *may have been hit and officers may need to render aid to him*.

According to Sergeant Muniz, he drove Officer Carbajal to the CP where Officer Carbajal was separated and monitored. Sergeant Muniz obtained a PSS from Officer Carbajal. Sergeant Muniz transported Officer Carbajal to Hollenbeck CPS and where he continued monitoring Officer Carbajal.

The FID investigation revealed that Sergeant H. Arangure, Serial No. 31707, Hollenbeck Patrol Division, Watch Commander, notified Department Operations Center (DOC) at approximately 2250 Hours **(Additional/Equipment – Notifications)**.

The FID investigation revealed that SWAT and the K-9 Unit completed the search of the area with negative results.

The FID investigation revealed that on October 24, 2019, Coleman was located and arrested for 664/187 PC - Attempted Murder of a Police Officer during an operation separate from this incident.¹⁵

FINDINGS

Tactics – Tactical Debrief, Sergeants Covarrubias and Grant, along with Officers Meraz, Bravo, and Carbajal.

Drawing/Exhibiting – In Policy, No Further Action, Officers Meraz, Bravo, and Carbajal.

Lethal Use of Force – In Policy, No Further Action, Officers Meraz, Bravo, and Carbajal.

ANALYSIS¹⁶

Detention

Detective Yoshida notified Sergeant Covarrubias that a citizen by the name of Lawrence had provided information to Detective Yoshida about a recent homicide. Detective Yoshida explained that Lawrence overheard a male, Coleman, discussing his involvement in a homicide. Lawrence heard Coleman stated he was responsible for the homicide and had shot the victim. Detective Yoshida also advised Sergeant Covarrubias that a complete investigation into Coleman had not been completed. However, Lawrence had provided information that Coleman was currently standing on a residential street with a firearm in a fanny pack and was “banging” on people. Detective Yoshida explained to Sergeant Covarrubias that Coleman was a prohibited possessor due to his documentation as a gang member and previous criminal history. Therefore, Detective Yoshida told Sergeant Covarrubias, Coleman could be detained for being a prohibited possessor. Officers Meraz, Bravo, and Carbajal were notified of this information by Sergeant Covarrubias.

Lawrence had previously heard Coleman stating he was responsible for a recent homicide that occurred within Hollenbeck Area. Lawrence stated he observed Coleman holding a fanny pack and believed Coleman kept a firearm in the fanny pack. Lawrence also stated the Coleman was “banging on people” who were passing on the street. Officers Meraz, Bravo, and Carbajal drove towards the last know location of Coleman and observed a male standing under a streetlight. As Officers Meraz, Bravo, and Carbajal observed the male, who was illuminated by the streetlight above him, they recognized the male to be Coleman and matching the description provided by Lawrence. Officers Meraz, Bravo, and Carbajal stopped their police vehicle and opened their doors to exit. Coleman began firing at Officers Meraz, Bravo, and Carbajal with a firearm, which resulted in an OIS. Coleman subsequently fled to an unknown location and was apprehended two days later where he was taken into custody. Officers Meraz, Bravo, and

¹⁵ The FID investigation revealed the separate investigation for the homicide which occurred on October 22, 2019, was still pending at the time of this report.

¹⁶ The analysis reflects my recommendations as supported by the preponderance of the evidence established by the investigation.

Carbajal's attempt to detain Coleman were appropriate and within Department policies and procedures.

TACTICS

Department policy relative to a Tactical Debrief is: *"The collective review of an incident to identify those areas where actions and decisions were effective and those areas where actions and decisions could have been improved. The intent of a Tactical Debrief is to enhance future performance."*

Department policy relative to Administrative Disapproval is: *"A finding, supported by a preponderance of the evidence that the tactics employed during a CUOF incident unjustifiably and substantially deviated from approved Department tactical training" (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 3, Section 792.05).*

The evaluation of tactics requires that consideration be given to the fact that officers are forced to make split-second decisions under very stressful and dynamic circumstances. Tactics are conceptual and intended to be flexible and incident specific, which requires that each incident be looked at objectively and the tactics be evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances.

Tactical De-Escalation

Tactical de-escalation involves the use of techniques to reduce the intensity of an encounter with a suspect and enable an officer to have additional options to gain voluntary compliance or mitigate the need to use a higher level of force while maintaining control of the situation.

Tactical De-Escalation Techniques

- *Planning*
- *Assessment*
- *Time*
- *Redeployment and/or Containment*
- *Other Resources*
- *Lines of Communication (Use of Force - Tactics Directive No. 16, October 2016, Tactical De-Escalation Techniques)*

Tactical de-escalation does not require that an officer compromise his or her safety or increase the risk of physical harm to the public. De-escalation techniques should only be used when it is safe and prudent to do so.

Planning –Upon receiving information from Detective Yoshida, Sergeant Covarrubias began planning with SPU officers while at Hollenbeck CPS and assigned roles to each officer involved in the operation. Sergeant Covarrubias planned to only detain Coleman for an active crime of possessing a firearm as a prohibited possessor and not for his reported relation to the previous homicide. Sergeant Covarrubias planned to send SPU officers to the scene to monitor for Coleman. Sergeant Covarrubias discussed escape routes commonly used by TMC gang

members and planned accordingly by setting up the appropriate containment near the commonly used egress. Sergeant Covarrubias also discussed perimeters, foot pursuits, apprehension versus containment, and communication on simplex and base frequencies when operating a police vehicle with three officers inside. Sergeant Covarrubias stated officers in marked black and white vehicles would assist with containment and apprehension.

Officer Meraz, on the day of the incident, discussed a plan with Officers Bravo and Carbajal such as contact and cover, requesting backup if they observed Coleman, and the presence of an air ship before arriving at the location. Officer Bravo's plan was to be a contact officer as the front passenger, but stated Officers Meraz and Carbajal could also engage in that role, depending on the tactical situation. Officer Bravo discussed three officer tactics since he and his two partners would be deployed in the same vehicle. Officer Bravo ensured he had a less lethal option on his person due to the nature of the incident. Officer Bravo stated he was familiar with the tactics of his partner officers not just due to the conversations from the day of the incident but from previous training days together as well as working together in SPU for approximately three months. Officer Carbajal stated he and his two partners created a plan which involved Officer Carbajal being a cover officer. Officer Carbajal, the rear passenger, stated his role could change and could be taken over by Officer Bravo as well. Officer Carbajal gathered information on Coleman and conducted the briefing with involved officers. Officer Carbajal stated each officer was assigned a role.

After the OIS, Officer Carbajal continuously adjusted his plan and, after discovering Officer Bravo was injured, utilized an additional unit to transport Officer Bravo for medical treatment.

Sergeant Grant arrived at the scene of the OIS and began creating a plan to remove involved officers from the location to replace them with additional responding units, once available. Sergeant Grant also met with Sergeant Covarrubias and created a plan to assign responding supervisors to each involved officer for monitoring duties.

Assessment – Sergeant Covarrubias, upon receiving information about the suspect from Detective Yoshida, assessed the exigency of the information provided by Detective Yoshida. Sergeant Covarrubias determined it would be in the interest of public safety to respond immediately to prevent Coleman from possibly injuring community members.

Officer Meraz assessed Coleman upon seeing him and determined, based on tattoos and his description, Coleman was the suspect for which they were looking.

Officer Carbajal assessed after firing his first round at Coleman and observed his service pistol had malfunctioned. After clearing the malfunction, Officer Carbajal assessed and observed Coleman running away.

After the OIS occurred Sergeant Covarrubias arrived at the officer's location. Sergeant Covarrubias observed shattered glass from the police vehicle and rounds on the ground that he assessed to have been fired in a southbound direction. Sergeant Covarrubias began broadcasting

his observations to Communications Division and requested containment as well as additional officers and supervisors.

Time – Sergeant Covarrubias determined that while the information Detective Yoshida provided was exigent and a public safety issue, a brief was important to create a plan and disseminate the information. The utilization of time allowed them to not only create their plan, but to also gather additional units for assistance. Officers Meraz, Bravo, and Carbajal all articulated their observations between and after they fired rounds at Coleman. Each officer utilized time to observe Coleman's actions and cease fire appropriately. Sergeant Grant ordered the officers to maintain cover as she utilized time to wait for additional resources before taking additional action in finding Coleman.

Redeployment and/or Containment – Officer Meraz, during the OIS, observed Coleman had stopped firing and was running in a direction away from the officers. Officer Meraz redeployed away from his vehicle towards a parked car to obtain a better position of cover, on the east sidewalk. Officer Bravo, observed Coleman flee and lost sight of Coleman behind a large vehicle. Officer Bravo redeployed to a position from which he would have a better view of Coleman's last location, on the west sidewalk.

Officer Carbajal immediately requested containment be set up and provided CD with Coleman's description. Officer Carbajal also determined they were standing directly in front of a known location which commonly housed TMC gang members and directed his partners to redeploy in a northern direction to move away from the known gang house location.

Sergeant Covarrubias held a containment position upon his arrival to prevent Coleman from returning to his original location. However, as soon as additional units responded Sergeant Covarrubias redeployed to the involved officers' location.

Other Resources – Officer Carbajal, requested the assistance of Hollenbeck NED detectives. Officer Carbajal believed the detectives would be more effective at monitoring the park for Coleman since the detectives were in plain clothes and unmarked vehicles. Officer Carbajal also utilized the information gathered by Detective Yoshida and Officer Megliorino as he disseminated the information to his fellow officers and detectives during the briefing.

After the OIS, additional resources including an air unit, the K-9 unit, and SWAT team were utilized in an effort to safely locate Coleman and resolve the incident.

Lines of Communication – Officer Meraz communicated his actions during the OIS to his partners. Officer Meraz stated he was going to redeploy to another position of cover, east of his original location. Officer Meraz also advised his partners that he was conducting a tactical reload and requested they cover him while he did so. Officer Bravo observed Coleman run away and communicated his observations to his partners.

Officer Carbajal gathered additional information on Coleman from Officer Megliorino by maintaining lines of communication with him. Officer Carbajal, throughout the OIS,

continuously relayed his observations to CD and ensured responding officers knew the direction Coleman was traveling and that he was armed. Officer Carbajal also maintained communications with his partner officers after the OIS and determined Officer Bravo had sustained an injury. Officer Carbajal communicated the injury to CD to obtain medical treatment for Officer Bravo.

Sergeant Grant began communicating with the involved officers immediately upon arrival and gathered information regarding the ongoing tactical incident. Sergeant Grant also relayed that information to Sergeant Covarrubias when he responded.

Sergeant Covarrubias ensured lines of communication were preplanned while preparing for the operation and instructed Officers Meraz, Bravo, and Carbajal to have one officer broadcast on Hollenbeck Simplex and one on Hollenbeck Base Frequency, in the event they encountered Coleman. Upon Sergeant Covarrubias's arrival at the scene of the OIS, he immediately began communicating with the involved officers as well as the air unit, to set up containment and request additional resources. Sergeant Covarrubias also ensured responding personnel were given updated information.

The UOFRB noted the exigency of the circumstances originally provided by Detective Yoshida to Sergeant Covarrubias. Due to its nature, the information was similar to that of a high priority radio call. In this case, the UOFRB noted a patrol unit would have been deployed to look for the individual if the information was utilized to generate a radio call. The UOFRB noted in this instance, an operation plan was not required and were satisfied with Sergeant Covarrubias's decision to conduct a thorough briefing prior to deploying officers to look for and monitor Coleman. The UOFRB was also determined the notification to Sergeant De Alba concerning the information the officers had received with regard to the murder suspect and their course of action by Officers Carbajal and Bravo was adequate. The UOFRB noted Sergeant Covarrubias and Officers Carbajal and Bravo's actions met the department expectations given these delineated circumstances.

Additionally, the UOFRB noted solid communications by Officers Meraz, Bravo, and Carbajal amongst themselves during the OIS. The officers communicated their respective tactical procedures such as redeploying to alternative positions of cover and when conducting a tactical reload. The UOFRB noted the extensive communication between Sergeants Covarrubias and Grant at the scene of the OIS. This assisted Sergeants Covarrubias and Grant to enact their plan quickly and without incident. Sergeant Covarrubias's communication before the OIS, and after, kept Sergeant De Alba apprised of the incident and prevented the need for additional briefings during this critical incident.

During the review of the incident, the following Debriefing Topics were noted:

Debriefing Point No. 1 Retention of Firearm During Tactical Scenario

Peace officers must always be aware of the location of their own firearm and be conscious of the opportunity it presents to those people around them.

Peace officers must be continually focused on:

- *what they are doing*
- *why they are doing it*
- *what is happening around them (Learning Domain 33, Chapter 6-4)*

After Officer Bravo discharged his service pistol at Coleman, Officer Bravo held his service pistol in his right hand and his police radio in his left hand. Officer Bravo placed his service pistol on the ground directly in front of himself and utilized his right hand to increase the volume control on his police radio. Officer Bravo then picked up his service pistol and held it in his right hand. Officer Bravo completed these actions while remaining behind cover.

Although the incident had rapidly escalated and Officer Bravo increased the volume of his police radio, a critical component to hearing transmissions, the UOFRB would have preferred that Officer Bravo had holstered his service pistol as he manipulated his police radio. The UOFRB noted the placement of his service pistol down onto the ground allowed for a greater risk of a possible negligent discharge. However, the UOFRB also noted that officers are allowed flexibility in their tactical response. If Officer Bravo had holstered his service pistol while he was in a kneeling position, it may have required him to move his service pistol and hand a greater distance than the location where he placed his service pistol down. In this incident, Officer Bravo placed his service pistol directly in front of him which allowed quicker access to his service pistol.

I assessed Officer Bravo's actions of placing his service pistol onto the ground in front of himself. I determined Officer Bravo's action was momentary while he still had immediate access to his service pistol at all times. After having been fired upon by Coleman, Officer Bravo believed the need to ensure a shots fired call was being broadcast was of greater importance than maintaining his grip on his service pistol. Since Officer Bravo was behind cover and his service pistol was in close proximity, I have determined his actions were appropriate.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that Officer Bravo's actions were reasonable given the deadly actions of the suspect and did not deviate from approved Department tactical training. In order to enhance future performance, I will direct that this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Debriefing Point No. 2 Utilization of Cover

Cover is defined as any object or structure that will stop the opponent's bullets. Officers should attempt to move to and use available cover when involved in any tactical situation and especially when there are weapons involved. Officers should be aware of what items in their surrounding area can be used as cover and what type of cover is required to stop specific rounds (firearm, shotgun, or rifle rounds) (Los Angeles Police Department, Basic Firearms Manual, July 2015).

Whenever possible, officers should place an object between themselves and the suspect as cover or a barrier. A barrier could be a chain link fence, wrought iron gate or any similar object that prevents the assailant from reaching the officer. If the suspect is contained and does not pose an immediate threat to officers, the public or himself/herself, time is our best tool. Time allows more opportunity to communicate with the suspect and helps to calm the situation (Los Angeles Police Department, Training Bulletin, Volume XLVI, Issue 3, Weapons Other Than Firearms, October 2017).

After the OIS occurred, Officer Bravo left his position of cover and walked southbound on the west sidewalk of Gless Street without the benefit of cover.

The UOFRB noted the aggressive nature of Coleman and that Coleman fired upon the officers without provocation. The UOFRB noted Officer Bravo not only had to protect his own life and the lives of his partners, but additionally had a duty to stop Coleman's aggressive deadly actions for the sake of public safety. Officer Bravo attempted to maintain observation of Coleman, and moved from cover to do so. In this case, it was understandable for Officer Bravo to obtain a better visual of Coleman to stop the threat and, to do so, had to momentarily leave a position of cover for those reasons.

I assessed the trade off by Officer Bravo between having sufficient cover or stopping a deadly threat. For the protection of community members in the nearby park, and the fact that this incident took place on a residential street, I determined the need for cover was lesser than the need for Officer Bravo to protect community members by attempting to maintain observation of Coleman's movements.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that Officer Bravo's actions were reasonable given the deadly actions of the suspect and did not deviate from approved Department tactical training. In order to enhance future performance, I will direct that this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Additional Tactical Debrief Topics

Loading Standards – The investigation revealed Officer Carbajal had loaded 14 rounds in the magazine of his service pistol. The fully loaded capacity for the magazine was 15 rounds. Officers are reminded to maintain their magazines in a fully loaded capacity. I will direct this to be a topic of discussion at the Tactical Debrief.

Tactical Planning – Officers Meraz, Bravo, and Carbajal stated their tactical plan was to take Coleman into custody if they observed Coleman at the location. Sergeant Covarrubias stated the tactical plan for Officers Meraz, Bravo, and Carbajal was to monitor the area from a distance and, if Coleman was observed, they would call in nearby officers who were driving a marked black and white police vehicle in order to conduct the stop. Due to the threat Coleman presented to community members and his connection to a recent homicide, as revealed from Lawrence to Detective Yoshida and then to Sergeant Covarrubias, the need for a quick response was evident to Sergeant Covarrubias. Sergeant Covarrubias conducted a thorough briefing wherein officers were assigned roles and plan was created. However, a discussion for clarity of the actions for

each role could have prevented the confusion between the officers and Sergeant Covarrubias as to their planned response if Coleman was observed. I will direct this to be a topic of discussion at the Tactical Debrief.

Service Pistol Malfunction – Officer Carbajal’s service pistol malfunctioned during the OIS. Officer Carbajal stated his service pistol, prior to the OIS, had previously malfunctioned several times during training. Officer Carbajal believed the malfunction could have been the result of dirt inside of his magazine, as well as his service pistol. It is necessary for officers to ensure their service pistols are well maintained and in good working order. Additionally, if an officer experiences a reoccurring malfunction they shall take their weapon to the Department Armory for inspection. Although Officer Carbajal’s service pistol has now been inspected and received maintenance from a Department armorer, I will direct this to be a topic of discussion at the Tactical Debrief.¹⁷

Basic Firearm Safety Rules – Officer Bravo momentarily placed his right index finger onto the trigger of his service pistol as he used his right hand to turn up the volume on his police radio. Later in the incident, Officer Bravo again placed his right index finger onto the trigger of his service pistol as he held his service pistol in a low-ready position. Officers are reminded of basic firearm safety rules and their importance not only for the safety of themselves and those around them, but also as a measure to prevent unintentional discharges. I will direct this to be a topic of discussion at the Tactical Debrief.

Situational Awareness – Officer Carbajal broadcast a help call immediately after the OIS occurred. While doing so, Officer Carbajal incorrectly broadcast his unit designation as “4 Queen 22.” Officer Carbajal was actually assigned as unit 4 Queen 24. Officers are reminded of the importance of stating their correct unit designation to avoid confusion about their location for responding officers. I will direct this to be a topic of discussion at the Tactical Debrief.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Command and Control is the use of active leadership to direct others while using available resources to coordinate a response, accomplish tasks and minimize risk. Command uses active leadership to establish order, provide stability and structure, set objectives and create conditions under which the function of control can be achieved with minimal risk. Control implements the plan of action while continuously assessing the situation, making necessary adjustments, managing resources, managing the scope of the incident (containment), and evaluating whether existing Department protocols apply to the incident.

Command and Control is a process where designated personnel use active leadership to command others while using available resources to accomplish tasks and minimize risk. Active leadership provides clear, concise, and unambiguous communication to develop and implement a plan, direct personnel and manage resources. The senior officer or any person

¹⁷ During the UOFRB, it was revealed a Department audit was conducted to determine the frequent malfunctioning of Department issued Glock brand firearms, specifically 40 caliber firearms. The audit concluded that a manufacturing error was the cause of the malfunction. All such firearms were inspected and repaired by the LAPD Armory.

on scene who has gained sufficient situational awareness shall initiate Command and Control and develop a plan of action. Command and Control will provide direction, help manage resources, and make it possible to achieve the desired outcome. Early considerations of PATROL will assist with the Command and Control process (Los Angeles Police Department, Training Bulletin, Volume XLVII Issue 4, July 2018).

Line Supervision – Defined. A supervisor who has the specific responsibility of issuing directions and orders to designated subordinates shall be considered as having the duty of line supervisor and shall be held accountable for achieving conformance with the directions and orders that he/she issues (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 3, Section 135).

Incident Commander (IC) – In accordance with Department Policy, the IC sets the objectives, the strategy and directs the tactical response. Directing the tactical response means applying tactics appropriate to the strategy, assigning the right resources and monitoring performance (Los Angeles Police Department, Supervisor's Field Operations Guide, Volume 2, Emergency Operations Guide).

Detective Yoshida contacted Sergeant Covarrubias upon receiving information from "Lawrence". Detective Yoshida requested Sergeant Covarrubias' assistance in locating Coleman. Detective Yoshida advised Sergeant Covarrubias to treat the incident as a man with a firearm, similar to a radio call. Knowing Coleman was a documented gang member, Detective Yoshida advised Sergeant Covarrubias that Coleman could not be detained in relation to the homicide investigation, but instead, could be arrested for an open charge if the officers observed him in possession of the firearm which Lawrence had originally reported. When Detective Yoshida was advised by Lawrence that Coleman had fled the area of 1st Street and Gless Street at the sight of a police vehicle, he informed Sergeant Covarrubias to call off the operation.

The UOFRB noted Detective Yoshida provided clear instructions to Sergeant Covarrubias by discussing the ongoing homicide investigation and its separation from Coleman's prohibited possession and public safety issue. Detective Yoshida provided thorough parameters for the basis of the detention of Coleman for Sergeant Covarrubias and SPU officers. Without delay, Detective Yoshida advised Sergeant Covarrubias to discontinue the response, as he became aware of new information and in the interest of public safety.

The actions of Detective Yoshida were consistent with Department supervisory training and met my expectations of a supervisor during an on-going investigation and related operations.

Sergeant Covarrubias received the information with regard to Coleman from Detective Yoshida. Sergeant Covarrubias directed officers to meet at the station for a briefing. During the brief, Sergeant Covarrubias ensured SPU officers had the assistance of not only a set back up unit driving a marked black and white police vehicle, but also two additional units to assist with containment. Sergeant Covarrubias maintained contact with Detective Yoshida and continually updated personnel on the operation.

When Detective Yoshida requested the operation be ended, Sergeant Covarrubias immediately pulled officers off the operation and returned to Hollenbeck CPS to debrief the incident. Officers Carbajal, Meraz, Bravo, Mott, and Malone advised Sergeant Covarrubias they were going to continue their crime suppression patrol in the area of 1st Street and Gless Street. Sergeant Covarrubias remained at Hollenbeck CPS to complete administrative duties. When Sergeant Covarrubias heard that Officers Meraz, Bravo and Carbajal request help over the police radio, Sergeant Covarrubias initiated his response. Upon his initial arrival, Sergeant Covarrubias did not respond to the officer's location, instead he held a perimeter position at the corner of 1st Street and Gless Street. After he observed Sergeant Grant responding he directed her to respond to the involved officer's location. Approximately three minutes later, Sergeant Covarrubias flagged down responding officers to replace him, allowing him to respond to the location of Officers Meraz, Bravo and Carbajal. Sergeant Covarrubias did so and began gathering suspect information. Sergeant Covarrubias identified Officer Meraz as an officer involved in the OIS, separated him and drove him to the CP location where he and obtained his PSS.

The UOFRB evaluated Sergeant Covarrubias's actions during this incident and noted that he demonstrated active leadership and displayed a calm and patient demeanor. While it is often expected that Department supervisors respond to assert control of a tactical incident instead of other duties, such as holding a portion of the perimeter, Sergeant Covarrubias' rationale and reasoning, and the need to balance the immediate tactical situation to contain the location was understandable with the need to respond to the scene of the OIS. Sergeant Covarrubias directed Sergeant Grant to continue her response to the scene to ensure that supervisory oversight was being initiated. Sergeant Covarrubias held his perimeter position for approximately two minutes. At the first opportunity, Sergeant Covarrubias replaced himself with a patrol unit and responded to the scene of the OIS with a minimal delay. Once at the location, Sergeant Covarrubias utilized planning, time, additional resources, and communication to effectively manage an ongoing and dynamic tactical incident as officers attempted to contain a shooting suspect.

The actions of Sergeant Covarrubias were consistent with Department supervisory training and met my expectations of a supervisor during a critical incident.

Sergeant Grant arrived at the location of the involved officers. Sergeant Grant directed officers to take cover and began assessing Officer Bravo's injuries. Sergeant Grant advised officers to maintain cover until she could access a ballistic shield. Sergeant Grant began developing a plan with the officers and explained their priority was to order community members back into their homes. The UOFRB noted Sergeant Grant's continuous communication with the officers at scene as she was planning. Sergeant Grant also communicated with Sergeant Covarrubias and took an active role in the planning and management of the incident, while working in conjunction with additional responding supervision.

The actions of Sergeant Grant were consistent with Department supervisory training and met my expectations of a supervisory during a critical incident.

Detective Chavarria arrived at the incident and identified Officer Blanco as an officer involved in the OIS. Detective Chavarria separated Officer Blanco, transported him to the CP location, and obtained a PSS.

The actions of Detective Chavarria were consistent with Department supervisory training and met my expectations of a field supervisor during a critical incident.

Sergeant De Alba, assigned as Assistant Watch Commander, responded to the location from Hollenbeck CPS and assumed the role of IC wherein he broadcast his IC status over Hollenbeck Base Frequency. Sergeant De Alba directed all officers at scene, via CD, to don their ballistic helmets as he established the CP. Sergeant De Alba advised Sergeant Covarrubias to respond to the CP and assist with organizing the tactical operation. Sergeant De Alba also briefed responding K-9 and SWAT officers of the circumstances concerning the tactical incident. Sergeant De Alba remained at the CP until K-9 and SWAT personnel had completed their searches for Coleman. The UOFRB noted Sergeant De Alba maintained continuous lines of communication with SPU officers and Sergeant Covarrubias throughout the incident. Sergeant De Alba was able to quickly assume the role of IC due his active communication before and during the incident. Sergeant De Alba, along with the rapid response of additional resources and personnel were able to resolve this incident.

The actions of Sergeant De Alba were consistent with Department supervisory training and met my expectations of field supervisors during a critical incident.

Sergeant Muniz arrived and identified Officer Carbajal as an officer involved in the OIS. Sergeant Muniz separated Officer Carbajal and drove him to the CP location where he obtained Officers Carbajal's PSS.

The actions of Sergeant Muniz were consistent with Department supervisory training and met my expectations of a field supervisor during a critical incident.

Tactical Debrief

In conducting an objective assessment of this case, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that Sergeants Covarrubias and Grant, as well as Officers Meraz, Bravo, and Carbajal's tactics did not deviate from approved Department tactical training.

Each tactical incident also merits a comprehensive debriefing. In this case, there were areas identified where improvement could be made. A Tactical Debrief is the appropriate forum for the involved personnel to discuss individual actions that took place during this incident.

Therefore, I will direct that Sergeants Covarrubias and Grant, as well as Officers Meraz, Bravo, and Carbajal, attend a Tactical Debrief and that the specific identified topics be discussed.

Note: Additionally, the Tactical Debrief shall also include the following mandatory discussion points:

- Use of Force Policy;
- Equipment Required/Maintained;
- Tactical Planning;
- Radio and Tactical Communication (including Code Six);
- Tactical De-Escalation;
- Command and Control;
- Lethal Force.

General Training Update (GTU)

On November 07, 2019, Officers Meraz, Bravo, and Carbajal attended a GTU. The GTU covered all mandatory topics.

Drawing/Exhibiting

Department policy relative to drawing and exhibiting a firearm is: *"An officer's decision to draw or exhibit a firearm should be based on the tactical situation and the officer's reasonable belief there is a substantial risk that the situation may escalate to the point where deadly force may be justified"* (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume No. 1, Section 556.80).

Officer Meraz

According to Officer Meraz, he observed Coleman's hand was in his fanny pack. Officer Meraz placed his vehicle in park and opened his driver door with his left hand. As Officer Meraz began exiting the driver seat to conduct a stop on Coleman, he observed a muzzle flash and a loud bang from Coleman's direction. Officer Meraz immediately recognized Coleman was shooting at him. Officer Meraz leaned out of his vehicle as he drew his service pistol. Officer Meraz utilized a two-handed grip to take hold of his service pistol.

Officer Meraz recalled,

I saw the suspect and he was standing on the sidewalk and he looked in my direction. I immediately recognized him and told my partners that that was the suspect we were looking for. It appeared to me that the suspect was -- had his hand either in a fanny pack or a gun. I couldn't -- I couldn't tell. And he was looking at me. So I immediately put the car into park and attempted to get out to, you know, conduct the stop on him when I observed a muzzle flash and a loud bang from the suspect in my direction. So as I observed that, I immediately recognized that he was shooting.¹⁸

¹⁸ Officer Meraz, Page 6, Lines 10-22.

So I threw the -- I put the vehicle in park. I opened up the door with my left hand, and I leaned out of the vehicle as I drew my firearm and began -- With my right hand I took a two-handed grip.¹⁹

As -- as -- simultaneously as I was putting in park when I observed the muzzle flash and the boom, I immediately recognized that he was shooting at me and my partners.²⁰

He would be on the west side -- west sidewalk.²¹

Officer Bravo

According to Officer Bravo, he opened his front passenger door and stepped out of the vehicle after he observed Coleman. While stepping out, Officer Bravo observed the muzzle flash and heard gunshots. Officer Bravo made eye contact with Coleman and observed Coleman's arms extending. Officer Bravo knew he was being shot at by Coleman. Officer Bravo drew his service pistol to defend his life and the lives of his partners.

Officer Bravo recalled,

As soon as I open the door and my foot stepped, I just saw the muzzle flash and heard the gunshots. I remember looking at him, just making eye contact and arms extending and seeing the muzzle flash. And at that time, it was just -- I knew I was behind the curve. Immediately knowing that I was being shot at and I thought, oh, crap this is the end, I drew my weapon. I unholstered and drew my weapon to immediately defend my life and my partners knowing that we were being shot at.²²

Officer Carbajal

According to Officer Carbajal, he began to exit the rear passenger seat of his vehicle after observing Coleman. Officer Carbajal heard shots being fired in his and his partner officers' direction. Officer Carbajal immediately began to "jump out" of his vehicle. Officer Carbajal heard a window shattering from his vehicle. Officer Carbajal redeployed slowly to the right of a car parked next to the west sidewalk of Gless Street. Officer Carbajal observed Coleman shooting in his direction. Officer Carbajal drew his service pistol utilizing a two-handed grip.

Officer Carbajal recalled,

I immediately recognize as that's the suspect. As I'm trying to get out of the car -- and I think Officer Bravo and myself, we both opened the right passenger doors. He opens the front; I open the rear. I start hearing shots fired coming in our direction. I take cover. I immediately jump out of the car and I -- there's a -- I think it was a red car directly -- not

¹⁹ Officer Meraz, Page 21, Lines 7-10 and 12-13.

²⁰ Officer Meraz, Page 6, Line 25 and page 7, Lines 1-2.

²¹ Officer Meraz, Page 25, Lines 14-15.

²² Officer Bravo, Page 10, Lines 17-25 and Page 11, Line 1.

directly -- next to us on the west side. I jump out. I take cover as I'm hearing shots being -- coming our way, and then I hear shatter of the -- of our window of the car. I'm hearing shots being -- coming our way, and then I hear shatter of the -- of our window of the car... I move slowly to the right of that car off to the sidewalk -- to the west sidewalk. I draw my weapon, and I see the suspect still shooting at us. At that point I drew my weapon, two-hand grip. I had sight of the suspect shooting at us, and I had eyes on him.²³

The plan was if we saw this individual, we were going to detain, put out a backup. As all that was about to happen, we started taking shots. In fear for my life and my partners, we immediately jumped out of the cars, took cover.²⁴

As I'm trying to get out of the car -- and I think Officer Bravo and myself, we both opened the right passenger doors. He opens the front; I open the rear.²⁵

And I didn't say this earlier, but I did identify myself as I got out of the car. I did say, "Stop. Police." I know I made contact with him. I utilize my flashlight. So, you know, I think he -- this guy was just ready to shoot it out with anybody.²⁶

I made contact and I saw and I recognized him, and within seconds he drew a firearm and started shooting at us.²⁷

In this case, the UOFRB noted Coleman was the initiator of aggressive and deadly actions as he fired upon Officers Meraz, Bravo, and Carbajal as they exited their vehicle. The UOFRB noted Coleman created a substantial risk of death which lead to Officers Meraz, Bravo, and Carbajal defending their lives by drawing their service pistols.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that an officer with similar training and experience as Officers Meraz, Bravo, and Carbajal while faced with similar circumstances, would reasonably believe that there was a substantial risk the situation may escalate to the point where deadly force may be justified.

Therefore, I find Officers Meraz, Bravo, and Carbajal's Drawing/Exhibiting to be In Policy, No Further Action.

Use of Force – General

It is the policy of this Department that personnel may use only that force which is "objectively reasonable" to:

- *Defend themselves;*

²³ Officer Carbajal, Page 18, Lines 2--18.

²⁴ Officer Carbajal, Page 28, Lines 10-14.

²⁵ Officer Carbajal, Page 18, Lines 3-7.

²⁶ Officer Carbajal, Page 41, Lines 8-12.

²⁷ Officer Carbajal, Page 23, Lines 24-25 and Page 24, Line 1.

- *Defend others;*
- *Effect an arrest or detention;*
- *Prevent escape; or,*
- *Overcome resistance*

The Department examines reasonableness using Graham v. Connor and from the articulated facts from the perspective of a Los Angeles Police Officer with similar training and experience placed in generally the same set of circumstances. In determining the appropriate level of force, officers shall evaluate each situation in light of facts and circumstances of each particular case. Those factors may include, but are not limited to:

- *The seriousness of the crime or suspected offense;*
- *The level of threat or resistance presented by the subject;*
- *Whether the subject was posing an immediate threat to officers or a danger to the community;*
- *The potential for injury to citizens, officers or subjects;*
- *The risk or apparent attempt by the subject to escape;*
- *The conduct of the subject being confronted (as reasonably perceived by the officer at the time);*
- *The amount of time and any changing circumstances during which the officer had to determine the type and amount of force that appeared to be reasonable;*
- *The availability of other resources;*
- *The training and experience of the officer;*
- *The proximity or access of weapons to the subject;*
- *Officer versus subject factors such as age, size, relative strength, skill level, injury/exhaustion and number officers versus subjects; and,*
- *The environmental factors and/or other exigent circumstances (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 1, Section 556.10).*

Lethal Use of Force

Law enforcement officers are authorized to use deadly force to:

- *Protect themselves or others from what is reasonably believed to be an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury; or,*
- *Prevent a crime where the subject's actions place person(s) in imminent jeopardy of death or serious bodily injury; or,*
- *Prevent the escape of a violent fleeing felon when there is probable cause to believe the escape will pose a significant threat of death or serious bodily injury to the officer or others if apprehension is delayed. In this circumstance, officers shall, to the extent practical, avoid using deadly force that might subject innocent bystanders or hostages to possible death or injury (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume No.1, Section 556.10).*

Officer Meraz – 9mm, nine rounds in a southwesterly direction from an approximate distance of 32 feet.

According to Officer Meraz, he observed sparks from Coleman's direction and pieces of cloth breaking, consistent with a firearm being fired from a fanny pack or through a bag. Officer Meraz believed it was possibly a higher caliber weapon. Officer Meraz determined Coleman was a deadly threat to Officer Meraz and his partner officers. Officer Meraz exited the vehicle and crouched low for cover while positioned between the frame of the window of the driver door and the A-pillar of the vehicle. Officer Meraz utilized a two-handed grip and fired in a southwest direction at Coleman. Each time Officer Meraz would fire, he would quickly reassess to see if Coleman was still standing and firing his firearm. Officer Meraz observed during each assessment, that it appeared Coleman was still firing rounds at Officer Meraz. Officer Meraz recalled he fired nine rounds from his service pistol in a consecutive manner, with a pause in between each round he fired. Officer Meraz fired in a rapid manner since he believed Coleman had more fire power and needed to be stopped. Officer Meraz believed Coleman fired approximately three to four rounds in his direction.

Officer Meraz recalled,

I heard a loud bang. I saw sparks and I saw what appeared to be a round being fired at me, and I saw what appeared to be a -- like pieces of cloth kind of breaking consistent with a firearm being fired from either a fanny pack or through a bag.²⁸

To me it sounded like a shotgun. I don't -- the boom sounded very loud, maybe louder than a normal pistol. So it sounded to me like a higher caliber weapon.²⁹

...it looked like sparks coming at me and kind of blossoming into a circle. And it appeared that there was a spark that landed a little bit further -- almost just directly in front of my car. I don't know if that was a round from the suspect hitting the asphalt or what. But I remember seeing that -- that muzzle flash -- that fiery explosion and that spark on the ground.³⁰

It looked to me like it was about, I'd say, five feet in front of the vehicle.³¹

So I in turn got out of the vehicle and returned fire in his direction. At which point he continued to fire and we exchanged gunfire.³²

I immediately got out of the vehicle and began to engage him and return fire to -- in attempt to stop him from shooting me or my partners... With my right hand I took a two-handed grip

²⁸ Officer Meraz, Page 20, Lines 12-17.

²⁹ Officer Meraz, Page 27, Line 25 and Page 28, Lines 1-3.

³⁰ Officer Meraz, Page 28, Lines 10-17.

³¹ Officer Meraz, Page 41, Lines 12-13.

³² Officer Meraz, Page 7, Lines 3-5.

and began to shoot at the suspect and while staying low to maintain cover between -- with the engine block and the suspect, so he couldn't fire rounds and hit me. ...When I came on sight and had my -- when I was aiming at the suspect, I put my finger on the trigger ready to shoot him... I was shooting in between the -- I don't know how to describe it. The windshield frame... That's -- I was -- I was shooting between the frame of the window of the door and the A-pillar of the vehicle and while maintaining a low, almost crouched posture to keep myself from standing up and becoming a better target... To stop the threat from -- you know, from the suspect from shooting me.³³

I was firing southwest towards the suspect.³⁴

My first initial return fire was rapid, because I needed to -- he already had fire superiority over us and I needed to, you know, gain fire superiority over the suspect.³⁵

And then it appears as though he shot another shot at me, so I kind of ducked and then returned fire again. There's kind of a break in the shots. And it was all just to basically stop the threat and keep the suspect from firing at me and my partners.³⁶

Every time I would shoot, I'd quickly reassess to see if he was still standing there and firing rounds or if he had the gun in his hand. And every time I did my reassessment, it appeared to me that he was still firing rounds at me and holding the gun and still remained a very real threat to me and my partners. ...After my final round, it appeared to me that the suspect had fled southbound and that's when I decided to use that opportunity to redeploy.³⁷

After my final round, I reassessed again, I redeployed, and then I did a 1 reload. I reloaded my weapon, and I reassessed to -- and I started communicating with my partners, telling them, "Hey, suspect was running southbound," and I gave them an approximate location of where I saw them and so they could broadcast that to responding units.³⁸

It was consecutive fire with a pause between -- I'm not sure which rounds when the suspect fired back at me. That was the only pause from my shooting to him and him exchanging fire with me.³⁹

When asked by the FID investigator how many rounds he fired at Coleman, Officer Meraz recalled,

³³ Officer Meraz, Page 20, Lines 23-25; Page 21, Line 1, Lines 12-16, and Lines 21-23; Page 22, Lines 4-6 and Lines 14-18; Officer Meraz, Page 23, Lines 17-18.

³⁴ Officer Meraz, Page 28, Lines 21-22.

³⁵ Officer Meraz, Page 36, Lines 7-10.

³⁶ Officer Meraz, Page 36, Lines 11-15.

³⁷ Officer Meraz, Page 24, Lines 17-23; Page 25, Lines 7-10.

³⁸ Officer Meraz, Page 25, Lines 24-25 and Page 26, Lines 1-6.

³⁹ Officer Meraz, Page 36, Lines 19-23.

*I believe nine -- nine rounds.*⁴⁰

When the FID investigator asked Officer Meraz, "Did you fire in rapid succession?" Officer Meraz recalled,

*Because the threat was --he was continuing to shoot at me.*⁴¹

When asked by the FID investigator how long it took to fire all nine rounds, Officer Meraz recalled,

*Approximately ten seconds.*⁴²

When asked by the FID investigator how many rounds Coleman fired, Officer Meraz recalled,

*I can only give an approximate. I approximate three to four.*⁴³

The UOFRB noted Officer Meraz initially utilized rapid fire. The UOFRB considered that Officer Meraz' assessed between each round. Additionally, Officer Meraz communicated his redeployment to other officers after firing his last round. The UOFRB noted his communication spoke to Officer Meraz' training in maintaining situational awareness and tactical communication. The UOFRB also noted Coleman was actively firing upon Officer Meraz, from a close distance, in a residential neighborhood with a public park and patrons nearby. The incident necessitated Officer Meraz to defend not only his own life, but to also stop Coleman from hurting other community members. Additionally, the UOFRB noted Coleman fired multiple times at Officer Meraz, demonstrating a notable degree of Coleman's aggression. The UOFRB also noted that Officer Meraz, in response to the imminent deadly threat, discharged nine rounds from his service pistol. Officer Meraz assessed again after his last round and ceased fire as he observed Coleman shuffling backwards, away from the Officer Meraz and out of Officer Meraz' view.

Based on a preponderance of evidence and totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that an officer with similar training and experience as Officer Meraz would reasonably believe Coleman's actions presented an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury and that the use of lethal force would be objectively reasonable.

Officer Bravo – .45 caliber, four rounds, in two volleys of fire from an approximate distance of 30 feet.

According to Officer Bravo, he did not observe Coleman with a firearm. However, as soon as he stepped out of his police vehicle, Officer Bravo observed Coleman's hands extended and

⁴⁰ Officer Meraz, Page 23, Lines 3-4.

⁴¹ Officer Meraz, Page 24, Lines 5-6.

⁴² Officer Meraz, Page 36, Lines 19-23.

⁴³ Officer Meraz, Page 40, Lines 20-21.

observed a muzzle flash. Officer Bravo observed each muzzle flash had the same circular pattern.

Officer Bravo recalled,

I couldn't see the weapon. When as soon as I stepped out of the car, I just saw his hands extend and saw the muzzle flash and that kind of illuminated everything where I didn't really see what was behind; I couldn't make out the firearm... The muzzle flash kind of had the same pattern, you know, same kind of circumference. Everything seemed to be consistent from round to round... So, like I said, initially, saw the muzzle flash of his firearm and I heard the gunshots. As soon as I saw that, I drew my firearm and was already extending out my arms and the glass was breaking. Like I said, it seemed simultaneous.⁴⁴

Sure. When I saw the suspect, he was standing behind the Toyota Corolla, I saw just a bright orange flash that almost looks like a flame, kind of – I saw the flame, heard the gunshot and then the flame kind of extended into a circular pattern... It was right over the roof of the car.⁴⁵

When the FID investigator asked, “How many times did you see that”, Officer Bravo recalled,

All together, approximately four to five times.⁴⁶

Like I said, I fired when I saw the muzzle flash and heard the gunshot, I immediately returned fire and then again saw an additional muzzle flash as he is backing up and I fired an additional round at the suspect.⁴⁷

Volley One – Two rounds, in a southerly direction from an approximate distance of 35 feet.

According to Officer Bravo, in response to seeing Coleman's muzzle flash and observing Coleman shooting at him and his partners, Officer Bravo, acquired his front sight, and fired his first round and second round at Coleman, as a controlled pair.⁴⁸ As Officer Bravo fired at Coleman from behind the front passenger door, the window shattered. Officer Bravo was unsure if the shattering was caused by his fired rounds or if it was due to Coleman firing at him.

Officer Bravo recalled,

I kind of extended front side and fired my first round at the suspect. Immediately after, I fired an additional round and there was another muzzle flash coming from the suspect. So, after I

⁴⁴ Officer Bravo, Page 17. Lines 24-25; Page 18, Lines 1-3, Page 18, Lines 12-15, Page 19, Lines 3-6.

⁴⁵ Officer Bravo, Page 27, Lines 17-24.

⁴⁶ Officer Bravo, Page 28, Lines 1-2.

⁴⁷ Officer Bravo, Page 29, Lines 24-25 and Page 30, Lines 1-2.

⁴⁸ A controlled pair consists of firing two rounds with the sight picture being verified (flash sight picture) before each shot. At moderate distances, the controlled pair may be appropriate in order to ensure that both rounds hit the target (LAPD Firearms Manual, “Firing in Pairs”, Page 29).

saw his muzzle flash and heard the gunshot, I fired my first round and immediately fired another round as a controlled pair directly at the suspect.⁴⁹

I fired, I think two rounds right away as soon as I saw the muzzle flash and saw him shooting at us. I just acquired my front side and just put two rounds and just tried to put a controlled pair right at the suspect. The window shattered. I honestly don't know if it was me shooting, just trying to get rounds down as fast as I could or if it was his round that hit the door; I honestly don't know. I just remember the glass shattering.⁵⁰

Volley Two – Two rounds, in a southwesterly direction from an approximate distance of 35 feet.

According to Officer Bravo, after firing the first two rounds from his service pistol and hearing the glass shatter in front of him, Officer Bravo believed Coleman's rounds were striking the vehicle that Officers Bravo, Meraz, and Carbajal had deployed from. Officer Bravo took a kneeling position to get low behind his passenger door and pried out to see Coleman. Officer Bravo observed Coleman backing up in a shuffling manner, towards a Suburban vehicle parked along the curb. Officer Bravo observed two muzzle flashes and heard the sound of a fired round. From his kneeling position, Officer Bravo fired an additional round at Coleman. Officer Bravo stated Coleman was still standing at the Suburban when he fired the round at Coleman. Officer Bravo observed Coleman continue to back up. Officer Bravo fired an additional round after the last muzzle flash and gunshot that he had heard. Officer Bravo stated the rounds were in a southwesterly direction towards Coleman.

Officer Bravo recalled,

I saw additional muzzle flashes. I could hear the gunshots going off. I knew we were being shot at, so I went down to a kneeling position behind the door. At that time, there was, I think, it was a Toyota Corolla, he was standing behind the Toyota Corolla, so I can mainly see just from about the shoulders and his head. So, as I was returning fire, I could see that he was backing up, kind of shuffling backwards going southbound on the sidewalk. He was still kind of hugging the cars. And then he backed up towards, it was blue Suburban, and I could still see muzzle flash, saw that he fired another two rounds; this was probably about the fourth round that I saw the muzzle flash and heard the shot. So from the kneeling position, I fired additional rounds, I think, three rounds from the kneeling position at the suspect when he was alongside of the Suburban.⁵¹

After I fired those rounds and the glass shattered, in my mind I thought it was his round that struck the door. I thought it was his round that broke that glass. That's the first thing that went through my head was like, oh, crap, his rounds are hitting us. So, I got down to a kneeling position and tried to get as low as I could behind the door and I kind of pried out

⁴⁹ Officer Bravo, Page 19, Lines 18-25 and Page 20, Line 1.

⁵⁰ Officer Bravo, Page 11, Lines 4- 13.

⁵¹ Officer Bravo, Page 11, Lines 14- 25 and Page 12, Lines 1-4.

next to the door to see the suspect and I could see him backing up, like, shuffling backwards towards the Suburban. And then I saw another two muzzle flashes and heard the gunshots; that's when I fired one more round at the suspect. He continued to back up and I fired another round after the last muzzle flash and gunshot that I heard... the rounds were going to be fired in like a southwest direction towards the suspect on the sidewalk.⁵²

...he was alongside the Suburban. At that time, I was yelling for Officer Carbajal, put it out, you know, put it out. I couldn't see the suspect anymore; I lost him behind the Suburban.⁵³

The UOFRB noted that Coleman fired upon the officers first, without provocation. During Officer Bravo's first volley, Officer Bravo observed Coleman's arms extended in a manner consistent with holding a firearm. Officer Bravo then observed muzzle flash which indicated that Coleman was firing at Officer Bravo and the other officers. Officer Bravo assessed and returned fire to stop the threat Coleman continued to present.

The UOFRB noted that Officer Bravo heard glass shattering and believed the vehicle was being struck by Coleman's gunfire. Officer Bravo observed additional muzzle flash from Coleman and returned fire for Volley Two. Officer Bravo assessed again after his last round and ceased fire as he observed Coleman shuffling backwards, away from the Officer Bravo and out of his view.

The UOFRB also noted that Officer Bravo, in response to the imminent deadly threat, discharged two volleys of two rounds each, controlled pairs, for a total of four rounds from his service pistol. Both volleys were conducted utilizing the controlled pair technique of fire control. The UOFRB conducted a thorough review of Officer Bravo's use of controlled pairs and determined that, in this case, controlled pairs were appropriate utilized due to their efficacy. Additionally, the UOFRB noted Coleman's actions of firing not one but seven times at Officer Bravo demonstrated that Coleman was aggressively attacking the officers.

Based on a preponderance of evidence and totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that an officer with similar training and experience as Officer Bravo, would reasonably believe Coleman's actions presented an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury and that the use of lethal force would be objectively reasonable.

Officer Carbajal – .40 caliber, one round, in a southerly direction from an approximate distance of 38 feet.

According to Officer Carbajal, when Coleman began shooting, he stated it sounded like rapid fire from different weapons, but he could only see the muzzle flash of Coleman's firearm. Officer Carbajal was unsure if Coleman was utilizing multiple firearms due to the sound of Coleman's firearm being different from Officer Carbajal's service pistol. Officer Carbajal was in fear for his life and the lives of his partners. Officer Carbajal also considered the community members in the area. Officer Carbajal believed Coleman had no remorse or regard for human life. Officer

⁵² Officer Bravo, Page 20, Lines 13-25, and Page 21, Line 1; Page 23, Lines 22-24.

⁵³ Officer Bravo, Page 12, Lines 4-7.

Carbajal was in a position of cover behind a vehicle parked near the west sidewalk, north of Coleman. Officer Carbajal focused on Coleman from that position. Officer Carbajal placed his finger on the trigger of his service pistol and fired one round while simultaneously, Coleman was firing at Officer Carbajal and his partner officers. Officer Carbajal fired in a southerly direction as he was aiming at Coleman. Officer Carbajal, after firing his first round at Coleman, pressed the trigger of his service pistol a second time to fire again and felt that he had a spongy trigger. Officer Carbajal recognized his service pistol had a malfunction, cleared the malfunction, and looked up. Officer Carbajal observed Coleman running away southbound and out of sight. Officer Carbajal determined the shooting had stopped. Officer Carbajal believed the total rounds fired by Coleman were approximately five to seven but was unsure if was counting the shots from Coleman or from his partner officers.

Officer Carbajal recalled,

When he started shooting at us, it sounded rapid fire. It was loud, you know, and immediately my partners and I returned fire. But I know it was louder and it was kind of rapid, you know, how I perceived...It sounded louder, so I don't know if it was a 40... It sounded more like it was different weapons because of the rapid fire, I think. You know, I could hear my partners' shots being fired. I know that I'm at a close proximity to them, which is louder. But the shots that he's firing at us are louder and rapid. So I don't know if he had multiple guns or what was the reason of why it sounded like that to me, but it did sound different than our weapons.⁵⁴

I could only see the muzzle flash.⁵⁵

Just I was in fear for my life, fear for my partners' lives. You know, the community -- I knew there was kids out there. You know, this individual shooting at us, no remorse to, you know, human life or us.⁵⁶

I know that I made -- I made eye contact with him. And I can immediately see that further movement from his hand coming up, and immediately I could see the muzzle flash. He is -- I do remember seeing him walking in a -- backpedaling, I want to say, and shooting at us.⁵⁷

I was able to focus on him, finger on my trigger, and I shot one round in his direction as he was shooting at us.⁵⁸

I was firing southbound direction, aiming at the suspect... Approximately 200 feet maybe, maybe less. I'm not 100 percent sure.⁵⁹

⁵⁴ Officer Carbajal, Page 39, Lines 1-5, 10-11, and 17-25.

⁵⁵ Officer Carbajal, Page 37, Lines 1-2.

⁵⁶ Officer Carbajal, Page 41, Lines 37.

⁵⁷ Officer Carbajal, Page 38, Lines 9- 14.

⁵⁸ Officer Carbajal, Page 18, Lines 18-21.

⁵⁹ Officer Carbajal, Page 36, Lines 5-6 and 9-10.

So when I pressed the second time, I could feel the spongy trigger. You know, my training and my muscle memory, I immediately looked at my guy could see that there's a round in the chamber, but my slide -- the slide is not fully forward, I guess. So I do the tap, rack, and, you know, (Unintelligible) I can't even use the right verbiage.⁶⁰

My -- the first shot that I shot, the shell casing ejected, but the second round didn't feed into the chamber. So I tapped it and I could see that -- immediately feel and see that my gun was back in service.⁶¹

Immediately after that I tried to press the trigger again and I had a spongy trigger. I guess my training kicked in. I immediately looked at my gun. I tap racked and I hit the top of the slide and I noticed that I had a mis-fed.⁶²

I fixed my malfunction and I came back on target and, you know, saw the suspect was no longer in sight or, you know, shooting at us.⁶³

By that time I look up and try to see if the suspect is in sight, and I can see the suspect running away southbound and out of sight. I no longer could see that, you know, he's shooting at us. The shooting has stopped.⁶⁴

When I gave my statement, I think I said approximately five to seven. I don't know if I counted his shots and then the shots from my partners.⁶⁵

The UOFRB noted that while attempting to exit his vehicle, Officer Carbajal was presented with a deadly threat. Officer Carbajal returned fire and, after one round, discovered he had a malfunction determined to be an out of battery service pistol. Officer Carbajal's reverted to his department firearms training and quickly cleared the malfunction, assessing the scene again. The UOFRB noted Coleman's aggressive actions of firing approximately seven times at Officer Bravo. The UOFRB also noted that Officer Carbajal, in response to the imminent deadly threat, discharged one round from his service pistol. Officer Carbajal assessed again after he cleared the malfunction, and ceased fire as he observed Coleman was out of his sight.

Based on a preponderance of evidence and totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that an officer with similar training and experience as Officer Carbajal, would reasonably believe Coleman's actions presented an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury and that the use of lethal force would be objectively reasonable.

⁶⁰ Officer Carbajal, Page 29, Lines 23-25 and Page 30, Lines 1-4.

⁶¹ Officer Carbajal, Page 19, Lines 1-5.

⁶² Officer Carbajal, Page 18, Lines 22-25, Page 19, Line 1.

⁶³ Officer Carbajal, Page 30, Lines 6-8.

⁶⁴ Officer Carbajal, Page 19, Lines 6-10

⁶⁵ Officer Carbajal, Page 38, Lines 18-21

Therefore, I find Officers Meraz, Bravo, and Carbajal's use of lethal force to be In Policy, No Further Action.

Additional/Equipment

BWV – Officer Meraz' BWV was powered on during the OIS and had the appropriate two-minute pre-activation buffer. However, Officer Meraz activated his BWV after the OIS had already occurred. This issue was brought to the attention of Captain R. Stabile, Serial No. 26260, Commander Officer, Hollenbeck Area, who noted Officer Meraz activated his BWV after the OIS due to being fired upon. The dynamic and quick escalation of the incident necessitated Officer Meraz to immediately respond to a deadly threat and Officer Meraz activated as soon as it was reasonable to do so. Captain Stabile advised the issue would be addressed through the generation of a Supervisory Action Item (SAI) and the issuance of an Employee Comment Sheet. The Commanding Officer of Operations – Central Bureau (OCB) and the Director of the Office of Operations (OO) concurred with this action. As such, I deem no further action is necessary. As such, I deem no further action is necessary.

The Office of Operations conducted a random inspection of BWVs associated to Officer Meraz from May 11, 2019 through June 11, 2019, for compliance with BWV policy specific to complete recordings of investigative or enforcement contacts with the public. The results of the inspection indicated Officer Meraz had no prior deviations.

Officer Bravo's BWV device was powered off, prior to the OIS, as he was enroute from Hollenbeck CPS to the area of 1st Street and Gless Street. Officer Bravo powered on his BWV at 2138:46 hours, prior to the OIS occurring, and activated his BWV device late, at 2139:16 hours, after the OIS, resulting in a thirty second buffer. These issues were brought to the attention of Captain Stabile who advised the issue would be addressed through the generation of a Supervisory Action Item (SAI) and the issuance of a Employee Comment Sheet. Commanding Officer OCB and the Director of OO concurred with this action. As such, I deem no further action is necessary.

The Office of Operations conducted a random inspection of BWVs associated to Officer Bravo from May 11, 2019 through July 11, 2019, for compliance with BWV policy specific to complete recordings of investigative or enforcement contacts with the public. The results of the inspection revealed that Officer Bravo had one previous deviation from the two-minute pre-activation buffer requirement. This issue was brought to the attention of Assistant Chief R. Arcos, Serial No. 26185, who recommended the issuance of a Notice to Correct Deficiencies (NTC). As such, I deem no further action is necessary.

Officer Carbajal's BWV device was powered off, prior to the OIS, as he was driving to the area of 1st Street and Gless Street. Officer Carbajal powered on his BWV at 2139:18. Officer Carbajal activated his BWV device late, at 2140:26 hours, after the OIS, resulting in a short buffer time of one minute, eight seconds. This issue was brought to the attention of Captain Stabile who advised that the issues would be addressed through divisional training. The

Commanding Officer of OCB and the Director of OO concurred with these actions. As such, I deem no further action is necessary.

The Office of Operations conducted a random inspection of BWVs associated to Officer Carbajal from May 11, 2019 through June 11, 2019, for compliance with BWV policy specific to complete recordings of investigative or enforcement contacts with the public. The results of the inspection revealed that Officer Carbajal had one previous late activation. This issue was brought to the attention of Assistant Chief Arcos who recommended the issuance of an NTC. As such, I deem no further action is necessary.

Sergeant Covarrubias's BWV device was powered off while at the Hollenbeck CPS completing administrative duties. Sergeant Covarrubias powered on and activated his BWV device while responding to the OIS, resulting in a less than two-minute pre-activation buffer. This issue was brought to the attention of Captain Stabile who advised that this issue would be addressed through the generation of an SAI and the issuance of a Employee Comment Sheet. The Commanding Officer of OCB and the Director of OO concurred with this action. As such, I deem no further action is necessary.

The Office of Operations conducted a random inspection of BWVs associated to Sergeant Covarrubias from May 11, 2019 through June 11, 2019 for compliance with BWV policy specific to complete recordings of investigative or enforcement contacts with the public. The results of the inspection revealed that Sergeant Covarrubias had two previous deviations from the two-minute pre-activation buffer requirement. This issue was brought to the attention of Assistant Chief Arcos who recommended the issuance of an Employee Comment Sheet. As such, I deem no further action is necessary.

Sergeant Grant's BWV device appeared to be powered on while responding to the OIS. Sergeant Grant activated her BWV while driving from the Hollenbeck CPS in her police vehicle, and responding to the OIS location, the BWV did not have a full two-minute pre-activation buffer indicating that it had been previously powered down. Sergeant Grant also powered down her BWV while on-scene during the incident. The powering down issue was brought to the attention of Captain Stabile who advised this issue would be addressed through the generation of an SAI and the issuance of a Employee Comment Sheet. The Commanding Officer of OCB and the Director of OO concurred with this action. As such, I deem no further action is necessary.

The Office of Operations conducted a random inspection of BWVs associated to Sergeant Grant from May 11, 2019 through June 11, 2019, for compliance with BWV policy specific to complete recordings of investigative or enforcement contacts with the public. The results of the inspection indicated Sergeant Grant had no prior deviations.

Detective Chavarria instructed Officer Bravo to record his PSS on BWV. This issue was brought to the attention of Captain Stabile who advised that it will be addressed with informal counseling with Detective Chavarria. The Commanding Officer of OCB and the Director OO concurred with this action. As such, I deem no further action is necessary. As such, I deem no further action is necessary.

Driving While Maintaining Control of Service Pistol – Officer Mott, while driving his police vehicle and responding to the help call, drew his service pistol. Officer Mott continued driving with his service pistol drawn and held in his right hand. Officer Mott's BWV appeared to show the muzzle of his service pistol momentarily covering Officer Mott's left arm as he maneuvered his steering wheel while driving. This issue was brought to the attention of Captain Stabile who advised that Officer Mott will attend divisional training regarding this issue. The Commanding Officer of OCB and the Director of OO concurred with this action. As such, I deem no further action is necessary.⁶⁶

Profanity – Officer Mott utilized profanity while standing at his police vehicle while maintaining a portion of the perimeter. No pedestrians or occupied vehicles were nearby at the time. This issue was brought to the attention of Captain Stabile who advised that it will be addressed with informal counseling. The Commanding Officer of OCB and the Director of OO concurred with this action. As such, I deem no further action is necessary.

Basic Firearms Safety Rules – Officer Mott, believing that the Coleman may have been inside of a vehicle was driving away from the perimeter, pointed his service pistol at the vehicle as it turned onto 4th Street from Gless Street and the muzzle of his service pistol may have come close to his partner officer, Officer Malone. This issue was brought to the attention of Captain Stabile who reviewed the BWV footage and noted that due to the circumstances of the incident, Officer Mott's actions would have been reasonable. In order to enhance future performance, Captain Stabile advised that Officer Mott will attend divisional training regarding these subjects. The Commanding Officer of OCB and the Director of OO concurred with this action. As such, I deem no further action is necessary.

Situational Awareness – Officer Mott was holding the perimeter with his partner, Officer Malone. Officers Mott and Malone approached a vehicle near the perimeter to check for Coleman. Officer Mott, after observing Coleman was not inside of the vehicle, walked away with his back turned to the vehicle and its occupants. Officer Mott did so as Officer Malone was still speaking with the driver of the vehicle at the driver side door. Officer Mott is reminded of the importance of maintaining situational awareness of his partner officer and of any potential danger. This issue was brought to the attention of Captain Stabile who advised that Officer Mott will attend divisional training regarding these issues. The Commanding Officer of OCB and the Director of OO concurred with this action. As such, I deem no further action is necessary.

Notifications – Sergeant Arangure notified the DOC at 2250 hours. The OIS and the subsequent help call broadcast had occurred at approximately 2139 hours. The notification was made approximately one hour and fifty-one minutes after the OIS and help call broadcast. This issue was brought to the attention of Captain Stabile, who advised that this issue will be addressed with divisional training. The Commanding Officer OCB and the Director of OO concurred with this action. As such, I deem no further action is necessary.

⁶⁶ Officer Mott was not evaluated for Drawing and Exhibiting during this incident as his response was after the OIS occurred. Officer Mott was not included in the tactical aspects of this incident.

Audio/Video Recordings

Body Worn Video (BWV) – Officers Meraz, Bravo, and Carbajal’s had BWV devices which recorded the OIS. However, the BWV recordings did not capture sound until after the OIS occurred. Sergeants Covarrubias and Grant, as well as responding Officers Mott and Malone, recorded their responses to the OIS and their subsequent duties.

Outside Video – Force Investigation Division investigators obtained outside video from two locations. Dolores Mission School, 170 Gless Street, had three cameras at the property. No footage of the OIS was captured. Additional footage from the second location, Boca Factory, 1605 East 1st Street, captured Officers Meraz, Bravo, and Carbajal stopping on Gless Street just prior to the OIS. However, the footage was not clear due to distance.

Digital In-Car Video System (DICVS) – No DICVS from responding units contained footage of the OIS.

Chief’s Direction

The UOFRB noted that during this incident, an officer drew his service pistol while driving to the perimeter near the OIS location. I am directing the Director of the Office of Support Services (OSS) to conduct a review of Department training standards and issue a reminder to all Department personnel of the dangers and restrictions associated with the drawing of a service pistol while conducting vehicle operations.

Respectfully,


MICHEL R. MOORE
Chief of Police


Date: _____

8-19-20

LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT
USE OF FORCE REVIEW BOARD REPORT

INC NO. 050-19	CF NO. -	DR. NO. 19-0416020
OIS		

REVIEW BOARD INFORMATION

Location of Incident Gless Street/1st Street	RD 0461	Date of Incident October 22, 2019	Date and Time of Board Review July 27, 2019 at 1230 hours
Chair Assistant Chief B. Girmala, Serial No. 24916	Signature of Approving Board Members:		
Member (Office Representative) Commander D. Graham, Serial No. 32365	 <div style="position: absolute; right: 0; top: 0; transform: rotate(90deg); transform-origin: right top;"> RECEIVED AUG 19 2020 POLICE COMMISSION </div>		
Member (Police Sciences and Training Bureau) Commander R. Flores, Serial No. 30995			
Member (Operations Central Bureau) Deputy Chief V. Palazzolo, Serial No. 27433			
Member (Training Division) Sergeant G. Ryan, Serial No 30193			
Peer Member Sergeant C. Larios, Serial No. 36641			
Peer Member Officer T. Onyshko, Serial No 38337	T. Onyshko		
Presenting Commanding Officer Captain R. Stabile, Serial No. 26260			
NOTES:			
ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS:			
MODIFICATION TO PRESENT POLICY, PRACTICES OR TRAINING:			
<div style="text-align: right;"> <input type="checkbox"/> COP Date Signed: _____ <input type="checkbox"/> PC Date Submitted: _____ </div>			

Employee (Last Name, First, Middle) Grant, Dana		Serial No. 34715	Rank/Class Sergeant I	Incident No. 050-19
Length of Employment 21 yearsm 5 months		Current Division Hollenbeck		Time in Current Division 1 year, 11 months
Use of Force Review Board		Chief of Police		Police Commission
<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval		<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval		<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval
<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Other Issues</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Other Issues</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Other Issues</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)

Notes:

**Final Adjudication for Out of Policy/
Administrative Disapproval Finding**

- ☐ Extensive Retraining
☐ Notice to Correct Deficiencies
☐ Personnel Complaint

☐ Employee's Work History Reviewed

Notes:

***A Tactical Debrief shall be conducted for all Categorical Use of Force Incidents.**

Employee (Last Name, First, Middle) Meraz, Michael		Serial No. 42991	Rank/Class Police Officer II	Incident No. 050-19
Length of Employment 2 years, 7 months		Current Division Hollenbeck	Time in Current Division 0 years, 5 months	
Use of Force Review Board		Chief of Police		Police Commission
<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval		<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval		<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval
<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Other Issues</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Other Issues</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Other Issues</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)

Notes:

**Final Adjudication for Out of Policy/
Administrative Disapproval Finding**

- ☐ Extensive Retraining
☐ Notice to Correct Deficiencies
☐ Personnel Complaint

☐ Employee's Work History Reviewed

Notes:

***A Tactical Debrief shall be conducted for all Categorical Use of Force Incidents.**

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TABLE 1